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I. OBJECTIVES AND MAJOR CONCLUSIONS
One striking aspect of the U.S. economy's performance during
the last decade is the decline in thi? rate of return on corporate capital.
The potential significance of this "fact" is clear but its actual signifi-
cance is not. The decline may or may not indicate a basic structural shift
in the U.S. economy. It may reflect a serious weakness, a natural and
benign result of market forces, or something in between. Which interpreta-
tion is correct depends on several considerations, in particular the follow-
ing.
1. The steepness of the downward movement depends on how rate of return
is defined and which data are used to measure it.
2. Whether the decline is serious depends on the level from which it
starts. If the mid-1960 's was a period of unusually high profita-
bility, then the subsequent decline may merely be a return to normal
levels
.
3. The trend's importance depends on whether the cost of capital has
declined proportionally. If it has, then the falling rate of return
need not, in itself, be cause for concern.
I
i
We have attempted to clarify the issues posed by declining cor-
porate profitability over the last decade, to evaluate the evidence for
longer-term trends in profitability, and provide additional evidence about
causes and consequences. Our report is organized around two simple questions,
n3\SH4
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1. How have U.S. non-financial corporations (NFC's) fared?
2. How have rates of return on real capital held by NFC's behaved
relative to capital costs?
We answer the first question by determining how well investors in non-finan-
cial corporations have done. That is, we argue that the best single measure
of the performance of the NFC sector is changes in the capital market's
aggregate valuation of the securities issued by the firms in this sector.
We answer the second question by estimating rates of return on the capital
stock of NFC's. In most cases we have looked as far back in time as the
available data permit — usually to 1929 — but most of our analysis is
directed towards the postwar period from 1946-1975.
At the risk of oversimplification, our main conclusions can be
stated as follows.
1. Non-financial corporations have fared poorly since the mid-1960's.
This fact is evident from the most casual examination of stock market
data, and it stands up to careful examination. On the other hand, NFC
performance in the postwar period ending in 1965 was excellent.
2. When the market value of the securities of NFC's
is measured relative to the net reproduction cost of real capital held
by the NFC sector, the mid-1960 's is revealed as an unusually favorable
period. However, today's market values are not unusually low compared
to values prevailing in, say, the 1950's. Instead of asking why
today's performance is poor, we iright as well ask why performance
in the early and mid-1960 's was so good.
3. Rates of return on real capital saow the same pattern as market values:
exceptional performance in the mid-1960 's followed by a decline to levels
more typical of the early postwar period.
3 -
A. Real costs of capital seem to have been stable since about 1955.
Since then, fluctuations in the market value of non-financial corpora-
tions have been much more closely related to changes in operating
profitability than to changes in capitalization rates.
The implications of our findings are discussed in the concluding section
of this report. We also note there several areas in which further research
would be helpful.
- t^ .
II. THE PERFORMANCE OF NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS
Introduction
We are concerned with the profitability of non-financial cor-
porations in the aggregate. Although NFC's by no means account for all
of the private sector, they are the major part of it. More than half
of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) originates in the NFC sector. NFC's account
for more than 90 percent of corporate GDP, and more than 60 percent of
total business GDP. The net replacement cost of assets held by NFC's now
exceeds $1.2 trillion. Thus the past performance and current health of
this sector is a matter of interest and concern.
It is a widely accepted fact — a fact which we reconfirm below —
that NFC profitability has fallen significantly since 1965. Is this evi-
dence of relatively poor performance conclusive and unambiguous? N6t en-
tirely so: there are a number of difficulties.
1. The rate of return on captial can be computed in countless ways.
Some indicate a more serious decline than others. The National Income
Accounts provide several different estimates of depreciation,
for example. Each implies a different measure of income, a different
value for net capital stock, and a different rate of return.
2. What is to be included in capital stock? Most estimates for NFC's
in aggregate include only the net replacement cost of inventory and
physical capital — buildings, machinery and equipment. Land is
usually excluded — its true value is extremely difficult to measure
in any case. So is net working capital, aside from inventory.
- 5 -
3. What about intangible assets? These include, for example, the
extra value of a going concern over a random collection of physical
assets, as well as the value of cumulative expenditures on research,
marketing, and employee training. The extra costs incurred in a
period of learning-by-doing are a relevant asset which is almost
never shown on corporate balance sheets. Firms acquire valuable
2/investment opportunities by virtue of past activities.— Even
monopoly power is an asset from the investor's viewpoint.
The problems implicit in these questions have absorbed many
man-years of study. Despite this work, rates of return calculated from
accounting data are never entirely free of errors of definition and meas-
urement. Of course these statistics are indispensable for many purposes.
But they are not ideally suited for determining how business firms have
fared over the last decade or some longer period.
There is a simple alternative. The value of the firm is not
determined by the cumulative funds invested in it, or by the net replace-
ment cost of its stock of real capital, but by the stream of earnings it
generates for investors. The value of this stream at any time can be ob-
served directly by summing the market value of all of the firm's outstand-
ing securities. This is the true value of all of that firm's assets.
The income realized in any particular period can be found by adding the
cash payments received by investors to the change in the market value of
the firm's securities over the period, computed net of any new issues
of securities. The rate of return earned by that firm is found by divid-
ing income by start-of-period market value.
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In short, we propose to answer the question, "How well have
non-financial corporations per'ormed?" by using capital market data.
There may be some po,)ular resistance to the idea of using stock
and bond values to answer so fundamental a question. Many regard the stock
market as irrational, and ther^ifore an untrustworthy source for information
about real phenomena. We believe such suspi^cions are unfounded.
Some make the elementary logical error of confusing volatility
with irrationality. There is no necessary connection. The stock market
is a major locus for risk-bearing. In our view the stock market's vola-
tility accurately reflects the high degree of uncertainty actually exist-
ing in the economy. In fact, we suspect accounting estimates of firm values
precisely because they are so stable.
Some doubts may stem from conceit, in the form of an individual's
belief that he or she has a more accurate assessment of firm values than
the capital markets can provide. Often this belief is based on hindsight.
The belief is suspect anyway, since so few professional investors — who
are presumably the most knowledgeable — have been able to outperform the
3/
market consistently.—
Some doubts may reflect the inability to explain the day-to-day
or week-to-week movements of the stock market. Yet it is intellectual
arrogance to assume that something which cannot be explained is irrational
or meaningless. In any case, we are not concerned with short-term market
fluctuations, but with market behavior over a period of many years.
There is strong positive evidence that capital markets are effi-
cient, in the sense of responding promptly and accurately to new inforraa-
4/tion.— This is the main reason why we use capital market data with confi-
dence.
- 7 -
Rates of Return to Investors in Non-Financial Corporations
Table 1 shows nominal and real rates of return earned by in-
vestors in NFC's for various one- and five-year intervals between 1929
and 1975. The time pattern of rates of return is obvious — but, before
concluding anything from the pattern, it is important to understand how
these figures were computed.
The rate of return R is defined as follows:
R
t
/MV (D)\ /MV (E)\
where R (E) = the rate of return earned in year t on a portfolio of all
the equity shares of all NFC's. R (E) includes both divi-
dends and capital gains.
MV (E) = the market value of that equity portfolio at the start of
year t.
R (D) = the rate of return earned in year t on a portfolio of all
the net outstanding debt of NFC's. R (D) includes interest
receipts and capital gains or losses.
MV (D) = the market value of that debt portfolio at the start of
year t.
MV = the total market value of all NFC securities
(MV (D) + MV (E)) at the start of year t.
Thus R is the rate of return earned on a portfolio of all securities
issued by NFC's. It is the return to all bond- and stockholders considered
as a group.
Table 1
AVERAGE RATES OF RETURK EARNED BY INVESTORS
IN NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS, 1929-75
A. Annual Returns (Percent)
Table 1 (continued)
Sources
Annual returns are weighted averages of rates of return on debt and
equity held from the beginning to the end of the year.
The equity rate of return is the annual rate of return, including
both dividends and capital gains, on the Standard and Poor's Composite
Index, as reported in R. Ibbotsen and R. Sinquefield, "Stocks, Bonds,
Bills and Inflation: Year-by-Year Historical Returns (1926-74).
Journal of Business 49 (January 1976), Table 1, pp. 20-22. Figures
for 1975 were generously supplied by Ibbotsen and Sinquefield.
The debt return is the rate of return on a portfolio of long-term
corporate bonds constructed by Ibbotsen and Sinquefield. The returns
are reported by Ibbotsen and Sinquefield in their Table 3, pp. 26-28.
The portfolio weights are the proportional contributions of debt and
equity to the total estimated market value of all nonfinancial cor-
porations. See Appendix Table Al.
Real returns are found by subtracting percentage changes in the con-
sumer price index, as reported by Ibbotsen and Sinquefield, Table 5,
pp. 32-34.
3. The returns in Panel B are simple averages of the returns in Panel A.
Note that the period 1929-35 actually contains seven years.
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We examine R rather than R (E) because we are concerned with
the performance of the entire NFC sector, not with the return received by
holders of a claim on part of that sector's earnings. Stockholders may
have gained at the expense of bondholders, or vice versa, but that is not
relevant here.— It is also important that our profitability measure be
unaffected by shifts in capital structure over time.—
Of course, not all NFC securities are publicly traded. Even for
securities that are publicly traded, price data are not always conveniently
available. Therefore it was necessary to work out a procedure for estimat-
ing the variables in Eq. (1).— MV (D) was found by capitalizing net
8/
interest paid by NFC's by the Moody's Baa interest rate.— Similarly,
MV (E) was found by capitalizing net NFC dividends by the dividend yield
on the Standard and Poor's Composite Stock Index. R (D) is the rate of
return on a portfolio of long-term corporate bonds. R (E) is the rate of
return on the Standard and Poor's Composite Stock Index. The details of
the calculations are described in notes to the table and in the Appendix.
Since the MV's are estimates, we cannot be sure that the values
shown are absolutely accurate at any point in time. But we are confident
that any careful estimate of market values will show the same pattern
across time.
The rates of return R are extremely volatile when measured on
an annual basis. That is evident from Panel A of Table 1. However, hind-
9/
sight reveals a pattern.— Investors in NFC securities fared very well
indeed after World War II and up to about 1965, but poorly after that.
The contrast between the first and second half of the 1960 's is dramatic,
particularly when real rates of return are examined. (See the five-year
9 -
average returns shown in Panel B.) The poor performance of the late
1960's continues in the first half of the 1970's. The evidence in Table
1 indicates that non-financial corporations have earned, on average, a
negative real rate of return over the last decade.
Figure 1 displays the returns in a different way. Suppose that
at the start of 1947 you had invested $1.00 in the portfolio of all bonds
and stocks issued by NFC's. That is, you started by ovming a very small
fraction of the portfolio of all NFC securities, which in aggregate was
worth MV Q, . You then followed a buy-and-hold strategy, reinvesting all
dividends and interest. The rate of growth in this investment's value
indicates how well or poorly NFC's have fared.
Of course Figure 1 tells the same story as Table 1, but it is told
in a way that may be easier to appreciate. Both nominal and real values
increased rapidly, with few interruptions, up to about 1965. After that
there was slower and more erratic growth in the portfolio's nominal value.
Its real value declined.
Aggregate Market Value of NFC Securit ies
There is still another way to look at capital market data. The
upper line in Figure 2 shows "q,"— the ratio of NFC market value, MV
,
to CS
,
the net replacement (not historical) cost of NFC capital stock and
inventory.— q is plotted for the period 1946-75. Scaling market value
by OS adjusts for that part of the movement in MV that was due to infla-
tion and expansion of the scale of NFC operations. A value of q = 1.0
means that the market value of the earnings stream generated by NFC assets
is exactly equal to the net replacement ct)St of those assets. This is the
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value for q we expect to observe i^ the economy is in long-run equilibrium,
if the definition of CS includes all income-producing assets, and if^ MV
and CS are measured without error. Recognizing these "ifs," we should
not read too much significance into the absolute value of q. It is never-
theless odd to find q so far below 1.0 in the early postwar period. If
the estimates are anywhere near correct, it was far cheaper for firms to
add capacity by purchasing other firms, than by buying fresh plant,
equipment and inventory.
The year 1965 is the turning point for q. From there it has
followed an erratic downward course to its current value of about 1.0.
Note, however, that q remains well above the levels characteristic of the
early postwar period. In fact, the high rates of return earned by investors
in NFC securities over the 1946-55 period can be largely attributed to the
recovery of q to more "reasonable" levels.
The bottom line in Figure 2 shows q computed on an "augmented"
capital base. The augmented base includes not only inventory and real
capital but also estimates of the other assets held by NFC's — land,
cash, accounts receivable, etc. The estimation and significance of the
augmented base are discussed below and in the Appendix. For the moment
we merely note that the choice of the base used in calculating q does not
affect its pattern over time.
Numerical values for the standard and augmented q are given in
Table 2 for 1929-75. There is one major surprise in the prewar data,
q was higher in 1936 than it has been at any time since! Its average level
from 1934-39 compares favorably with the best years of the 1960's. The
Table 2
RATIO OF AGGREGATE MARKET VALUE OF NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS
TO NET REPLACE^EENT COST OF CAPITAL STOCK, INVENTORY
AND OTHER ASSETS, 1929-75
Year
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immediate reason is the actual shrinkage of the net replacement cost of
capital stock in the 1930's, (see Appendix Table A2a) combined with the
recovery in market value beginning in 1934 (see Table Al) . We have not
identified a deeper reason. But at least the magnitude of q warns against
the characterization of all of the 19 30's as a bleak time for U.S. corporations.
Interpreting q
Despite its interest and usefulness, q is easy to misinterpret.
Of course, there are problems of aggregation: the q for all NFC's hides
substantial interindustry and interfirm variation. There are also difficult
problems of measurement and definition.
Consider, for example, the following statement from the 1977
12/
Economic Report of the President :
—
If . . . assets are valued in the market significantly
above their replacement cost, corporations will be encour-
aged to invest in new equipment and thereby create capital
gains for the owners of their securities.
Properly interpreted this statement is correct, but it is nevertheless am-
biguous if taken literally.
Consider how the level of an individual firm's q affects the firm's
rate of investment. Figure 3 portrays the investment decision: the firm
invests to increase capacity until V, the present value of forecasted net
cash flows generated by an additional machine, declines to C, the cost per
machine. Since all but the last machine have positive net present values,
(V - C > 0) , the firm's q exceeds one. But the net present value
of the marginal machine is zero. That is, the marginal q equals exactly 1.0.
- 11a -
The quotation cited could be misinterpreted as a prediction that firms will
continue investing so long as the average q — which is what we observe —
is greater than one.
It is true that both average and marginal q's equal one in a long-
run equilibrium. ^ all industries are competitive, and i^ the denominator
of q correctly measures the value of all assets, including intangible ones,
then any opportunities to make investments having positive net present values
must last only for the short-run. In this sense it is true to say that
q > 1 for some firms implies profitable investment opportunities for others.
On the other hand, positive q's which reflect stable market power
would be self-sustaining. So would the q's of firms holding significant
intangible assets.
The quotation above would be unambiguously correct if it referred
to an increase in q. That is, an increase in q should predict an increase in
the rate of investment. Consider a firm starting at the optimal capacity level
a determined by V = C. In Figure 3a, the investment opportunity schedule
shifts up to V', thus increasing q. Investment increases in response, lift-
ing capacity to a new equilibrium above the initial level (1).
The actual adjustment might occur in a number of ways. If C is
constant the firm moves directly to (2), perhaps with a delay. It is perhaps
more realistic to assume the firm faces an upward sloping cost curve C' in
the short run, with the steepness of the curve depending on the speed of
adjustment. Still another possibility is that producers of machines will,
at least in the short run, capture some of the rents due to the upward shift
in V. This gives a cost curve C" and the equilibrium position (4)
.
But we can say the following regardless of the adjustment mechanism:
because q reflects the expected profitability of corporate investment relative
mDollars
Fig. 3. The Firm's
Investment Decision
Capacity
(Nximber of Machines)
Dollars
Fig. 3a. Effects of a Decrease
in q on Investment in Physical Capital
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to the opportunity cost of capital, an increase in q should signal increased
corporate investment.—
We have assumed in all of this that the denominator would always
be determined by the initial cost level C. The adjustment costs in C' would
not be picked up in capital stock as measured in the National Income Accounts,
although one could argue that they should be. For example, if firms face
adjustment costs, then the true secondhand value of all machines at the time
of Figure 3a is not C, but C' at capacity level 3. Nor would the National
Income Accounts pick up a short run increase in costs to C". The denominator
as we measure it has to be thought of as a long run replacement cost, given
current prices and technology. It probably does not adequately reflect
year-to-year changes in the marginal cost of adding new capacity.
Conclusions
The first 20 postwar years were a generally favorable period for
NFC's. Investors in NFC securities earned average rates of return on
market value that seem, in hindsight, to be unusually generous. In 1946
the aggregate market value of NFC stocks and bonds was roughly one and one
half (times) net replacement cost of NFC inventory and capital stock.
But for the next 12 years the aggregate- market value of NFC securities was
below the net replacement cost of physical assets held by NFC's. A sharp
relative rise in market value started in 1959. By 1965, aggregate market
value was 50 percent larger than a greatly expanded base of inventory and
real assets.
There was a dramatic reversal of fortune in the next decade.
Real rates of return to investors were low and often negative. Aggregate
- lid -
market value fell to roughly the same level as the inventory and real asset
base.
Of course we have no clue about why all this happened. Values
observed in capital markets show us only the end result of a complicated
process. Insights into earlier stages of the process must come from other
measures of profitability.
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III. RATES OF RETURN ON CAPITAL STOCK
In this section we exanine the profitability of the corporate
non-financial sector from a diffi'.rent point of view. In section II we
derived estimates of income and -^alue from capital market data. The esti-
mates in this section are based on annual measures of asset value and
operating income developed by the Bureau of Economic Analysis of the De-
partment of Commerce as part of the National Income and Product Accounts
(NIPA) . In effect we are moving from capital market measures of return
to the "book" or "accounting" measures utilized by business firms.
The capital market measures are sufficient to tell us how well
NFC's have fared, but they give no clue to the reasons for good or bad per-
formance. For example, we have no way of inferring from market value data
whether the period of unusually high market values in the mid-1960 's was
due to high operating profiLS, to low capitalization rates for NFC securi-
ties, or to a combination of both effects. The interpretation of capital
market data requires infonnation from other sources.
Many measures of rate of return can be derived from NIPA data.
The one we emphasize most is the rate of return on capital stock (ROC) , de-
fined as the ratio of NFC operating income, before interest , to the net re-
placement cost of NFC depreciable capital stock and inventories. Our estimates
are based on newly revised series prepared by the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Several important recent studies of the ROC have been based on national
income accounts data— but our analysis incorporates the latest revisions.
—
As is explained below, these revisions could be substantial enough, in our
opinion, to change one's interpretation cf the "trend" in ROC.
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Following other investigators, we interpret ROC as the real rate
of return on NFC capital stock. Of course, such an interpretation rests on
a number of assumptions, some of which are not strictly true. Firms must
invest in other assets besides inventories and depreciable capital stocks,
for example. (Towards the end of this section we examine ROC computed on
an "augmented" investment base.) Also, operating income equals real income
only if there are no real holding gains on capital stock and inventories —
i.e., only if the reproduction costs of capital stock and inventories rise
at exactly the same rate as prices generally. (Again, later in this section,
we adjust ROC for Holding gains or losses.)
Nevertheless, operating income is an important indicator of cor-
porate performance and a decent first approximization to real income. More-
over, the conclusions we reach below are insensitive to the exact definition
of income or ROC.
Before-Tax Rates of Return
The first column of Table 3 presents before-tax ROC's for the NFC
sector for the period 1929-75. These ROC's are plotted in Figure 3 for
the postwar period.
We will concentrate mainly on the postwar period. Three distinct
periods can be noted. From 1946 through 1960, the before-tax ROC tended to
decline, but with sharp year-to-year fluctuations. The average ROC was
13.2 percent. The decade of the]960fesaw a sharp upward burst in the first
half of the decade and a symmetrical decline in the second half. The average
for the period 1961-70 was 13.3 percent, slightly higher than in the pre-
ceeding years. Finally for the short period 1971-75, the average was 10.2,
noticeably lower than the other two period.' .
lie.
Table 3
RATES OF RETURN ON THE NET REPLACEMENT COST OF CAPITAL STOCK
AND INVENTORIES OF NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS, 1929-75
Year
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957 -.
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
Before-Tax
Rate of Return
Table 3 (continued)
1966 15.8 9.9
1967 13.9 8.8
1968 13.6 8.1
1969 12.0 7.0
1970 9.4 5.7
1971 9.7 5.9
1972 10.8 6.8
1973 10.4 6.3
1974 7.8 4.1
1975 8.1 5.0
The before-tax rate of return is the ratio of (1) before tax
operating income of -non-financial corporations, to (2) the net
replacement cost of non-financial corporations' inventory and
capital equipment. Item (1) is calculated after straight-line
depreciation on the net replacement cost of capital equipment,
assuming asset life is 85 percent of lives published in the
Department of Commerce's Bulletin F. Item (1) is before interest
and does not include inventory profits. Item (2) is the average
of inventory and capital equipment values observed at the start
and end of the calendar year. See Tables A2a and A4a.
2
The after-tax rate of return is calculated in exactly the same
way as the before-tax figure, except that taxes paid are subtracted
from operating income. It is defined after-taxes but before
interest. See Table A4a.
' ^c^
o o o c
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The last several years' ROC's are clearly the lowest in the table.
Was the decline from the peak of the mid-1960 's so sharp as to carry ROC to
a new low level? It appears so. But this result cannot be vigorously de-
fended. It is based on a short run of years, and may be a transitory or
cyclical phenomenon. Later in this section we make a more careful attempt
to extract the trend, if there is any, from the before-tax ROC's.
After-Tax Rates of Return
Figure 3 and Table 3 a^so present after-tax ROC's for the same
periods. The after-tax ROC differs from its before-tax counterpart only in
that corporate income taxes are subtracted from operating income. Operating
income is defined after taxes, but includes interest.
Security prices are, of course, based on after-tax income. The
after-tax ROC is the "book" counterpart to R, the market rate of return
on all NFC securities.
The after-tax ROC is perhaps more pertinent than its before-tax
counterpart as evidence in the current debate on profitability. It measures
the actual reward to suppliers of capital, or, as some view it, the amount
available to finance new investment. Has tha after-tax ROC tended to decline?
The three "episodes" observed for the before-tax ROC also character-
ize the after-tax figure. There are wide fluctuations around a 6.3 percent
mean from 1946-1960, then a sharp rise and fall in the 1960's. The average
is 5.6 percent for the period 1971-75.
—
Once again tha rapid increase and sharp reversal in the 1960 's is
the most prominent feature of the picture. One can surely conclude that
there was a burst of unusual profitability. In the 1970's, profit rates have
- 15 -
reverted to a level only slightly less than that of the 19A6-60 period.
Visual inspection of Fig. 3 provides no clear evidence that after-tax ROC's
have dropped to a "new low." If there is a downward trend in profitability,
it appears more likely to be found in the before-tax figures. However, we
postpone a more careful search for trends until later in this section.
Taxes
The narrowing spread between before- and after-tax ROC's is ex-
plained by a downward drift in effective corporate tax rates. A general de-
cline started in the early 1960's and has persisted since, although not
without interruption.
Some of the decline is due to purposeful government policies —
the investment tax credit, permitting accelerated depreciation and shorter
asset lives under ADR guidelines, and permitting LIFO inventory accounting
for tax purposes. But a major part reflects NFC financing policy — a grow-
ing proportion of debt finance — and a condition imposed by capital markets
— rising nominal interest rates.
Table A shows the growing importance of the interest tax shield.
We are now at a point where the tax deductibility of interest charges reduces
the effective tax rate on operating income by about 15 percentage points!
The right hand column of Table 4 shows what the effective rate of corporate
income tax would have been in the absence of the tax shield provided by NFC
debt. There is no evident downward drLft in this hypothetical all-equity
rate.
Although the effective tax rate has drifted downwards in the
postwar period, the trend is by no means the whole story. Bursts of infla-
tion have sent tax liabilities sharply up and after-tax profitability
down. Hankin has found a significant
Table 4
EFFECTIVE TAX RATES ON OPERATING INCOME
OF NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS 1946-1975
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negative correlation for the postwar period between after-tax ROC and the
rate of inflation, after adjustment for a time trend and the rate of change
of GNP. There was a strong positive link, between inflation and the
effective tax rate, but no significant link between inflation and the
before-tax ROC.
—
The negative impact of price level increases on the after-tax ROC
is no doubt due to the inclusion of nominal capital gains on inventory in
taxable income and to the limitation of depreciation to historical costs.
Alternative Measures
Although we believe the estimates of ROC presented above will be
widely accepted as reasonable and pertinent measures of profitability, many
other measures are possible. Using the same underlying data base, other
assumptions about depreciation patterns and service lives give different
estimates. Also, different or expanded data bases could be employed. A
definitive case in favor of the particular coverage and assumptions on which
Table 3 is based cannot be made. Therefore we have developed a number of
additional ROC estimates to check that the patterns we have found
persits under alternative definitions.
Different depreciation patterns and service lives . In deriving
Table 3 we used the "standard" NIPA estimates of capital stock and depreciation
in current dollars. These estimates assume straight-line depreciation
and service lives equal to 85 percent of those given in Internal
Revenue Service Bulletin F.
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The NIPA data base can be used to develop a number of alterna-
tive estimates. From this set we have chosen three. One assumes a different
time pattern of depreciation — double-declining balance. For another,
different service lives are postulated — 100 percent of Bulletin F up to
1940, a gradual decline to 75 percent from 1940 to 1960, and continuing
at 75 percent from 1960 on. And for the third, "historical" values and costs
are used.
These changes in underlying assumptions result in very different
levels for operating income, capital stock and ROC. For mid-year 1970, for
example, net capital stock of NFC's is $508 billion under the "standard" NIPA
assumption. With double-declining balance depreciation it is $419 billion.
Likewise in that year, the numerator in the ROC calculation — after-tax
profit plus interest — is $41.3 in the "standard" case, and $36.6 billion
with double declining balance depreciation. These dramatic differences do
not carry through to the ROC, however. First, the denominator of the ROC
calculation includes inventory as well as depreciable capital. Inventory is
the same under all alternatives, so the denominators do not differ as much
as the capital stocks alone. Second, differences in both numerator and denomi-
nator, being in the same direction, tend to offset. The ROC as calculated
differs only slightly — 5.7 percent for the standard case vs. 5.8 percent
with double declining balance depreciation. ROC's both before and after tax
under all three sets of assumptions appear in the first three columns of
Table 5.^^
Clearly, the general pattern of ROC behavior over time for the
"standard" case also characterizes' the series for double declining balance
- 17a -
Table 5
J ALTERNATIVE ESTIMATES OF RATES OF RETURN ON
INVESTMENT IN PLANT, EQUIPMENT AND INVENTORIES
OF NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS, 1946-72
Part I - Before Tax
- 17b -
Part II - After Tax
- 17c -
Notes for Table 5
Part I
Standard Assumptions are explained in notes for Table 3.
Double-Declining Balance differs from Standard Assumptions by estimating
depreciation on a declining balance formula at twice the straight-line
rates. See Tables A2b and A4b
.
Changing Depreciable Lives differs from Standard Assumptions in employing
a pattern of asset lives declining over time from 100 percent to 75 percent
of Bulletin F lives to estimate depreciation, whereas the Standard Assump-
tions use a constant 85 percent of Bulletin F. See Tables A2c and A4c.
Historical Cost differs from Standard Assumptions in that it approximates
book avlues rather than replacement costs. In particuJar, there is no
Inventory Valuation Adjustment, and the capital stock is valued at cost
when initially acquired. See Table A2d and A4d.
Part II
All the measures in Part II are net of corporate income taxes. In deriving
After Personal and Corporate Income Taxes
,
an estimate of the federal income
taxes paid by recipients of the dividends and net interest payments of
Non-Financial Corporations is also subtracted.
We based our estimate of the Federal personal income tax on two empirical
regularities:
1. From 1947-1974, total personal income tax liability was a rather
constant fraction of total Adjusted Gross Income — typically 10-13
percent. (See Joseph A, Pechman, [17a], p. 323 and 326 for underlying
data.
)
2. Over the period 1947-57, the weighted average effective rate of per-
sonal income tax on aggregate dividends (National Income Total) ran
about twice as high as the rate on total Adjusted Gross Income (See
Daniel M. Holland, [9a], p. 112 for relevant data.)
Therefore, for the period 1946-75 we assumed the effective rate on dividend
receipts to be twice that on total Adjusted Gross Income. (We took the
1947 rates to hold for 1946, and 1974 rates to apply in 197").) Given that
a large fraction of corporate bonds is held by non-taxable (or lightly taxed)
intermediaries, the effective rate on interest should be lov;er than that
on dividends, but higher than that on total Adjusted Gross Income. We took
the effective rate of tax on interest to be equal to that on Adjusted Gross
Income plus one half the difference between the dividend rate and that on
Adjusted Gross Income.
- 17d -
Notes for Table 5 (continued)
Further personal income tax could be due in an ensuing year on the real-
ized capital gains due to the earnings retained in a given year. Our
estimates take no account of this. But the distortion is likely to be quite
small. A good fraction of corporate earnings "belong" to non-taxable
owners, and most of potentially taxable capital gains do not appear to be
taxed. See Bailey [la], p. 38.
- 18 -
depreciation and changing depreciable lives. Double declining balance gives
roc's slightly higher than "standard," changing depreciable lives slightly
lower. But all three have the same general configuration over time.
Among them these thret; encompass the range of all reasonable possi-
bilities. The "standard" case comes out in about the middle.
Historical Cost Accounting . — The ROC measures given in the
fourth column of Table 5 are intended to approximate NFC profitability as
it would be measured under currently accepted accounting conventions. This
"historical cost" series includes inventory profits in income, measures de-
preciation on an historical cost basis, and uses the book value (that is,
the historical cost of acquisition) of the capital stock. Thus the numerator
of the historical cost ROC calculation is overstated because inventory
profits are included and depreciation understated. The denominator is
understated because the historical acquisition cost of capital stock is
below the current cost of replacement. Thus the historical cost ROC over-
states real profitability.
The historical cost ROC is not a reasonable measure of real
return. Nor can anything of substance be inferred from its behavior over
time. But it is interesting nevertheless, because it shows the rough magni-
tude of error that would be introduced by measuring NFC profitability from
corporate accounts.
—
Effects of Personal Income f.T xe'?. — All the ROC's reported in Part II
of Table 5 are defined after corporate income taxes. For the last column we have
also subtracted an estimate of the pergonal income tax due from recipients of
- 19 -
the net interest and dividends paid by NFC's. The estimating procedure,
explained in the Notes to Table 5, simply approximates the additional tax.
For our purposes it suffices, however. While the after-tax ROC in the last
column is, of course, lower, the pattern over time is similar to the pattern
20/
shown by other ROC measures.
—
Augmented Capital Stock . — The ROC estimates presented thus far
compare NFC operating income to the net reproduction cost of plant, equipment
and inventory. But business firms also hold stocks of cash and accounts
receivable, and invest in land and various other assets. We were able to
obtain estimates of the aggregai e value of their items from the Treasury
21/
Department's Statistics of Incore.— Table 6 shows ROC's computed on this
augmented base. These ROC's an^ uniformly lower than those presented
in Table 3, because the capital base is increased. The ratio of the aug-
mented to the standard base has no clear trend over time, however,
22/
so the pattern of ROC's in Table. 6 is about the same as in Table 3.
—
Holding Gains on Capital Stock and Inventory . — As we have pointed
out, our measures of ROC includ-^ only operating income. That is, they ex-
clude real holding gains, if any, on NFC capital stock and inventories. This
is an accurate assumption if the net reproduction cost of capital stock and
23/inventories increases at exactly the same rate as prices generally.
Of course holding gains and losses are automatically included in
rates of return measured from capital market data. But they are more diffi-
cult to extract from the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) . How-
ever, a tolerable approximation can be made if the NIPA figures for net re-
placement costs of capital stock and inventories are assumed to be reliable
Table 6
RATES OF RETURN ON AUGMENTED BASE FOR
NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS, 1947-75-
Year
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
Before-Tax
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estimates of these assets' actual market values. Our procedure was as
follows.
1. Net replacement cost of NPC capital stock is given
both in current and constant dollars. The difference
between the rate of increase of these two series is the
rate of increase in the nominal value of a typical col-
lection of the capital goods held by NFC's. This rate
of increase was converted to real terms. (See
Appendix Table A6.)
2. The Department of Commerce publishes an inventory
valuation adjustment (IVA) for KFC's. The IVA is an esti-
mate of nominal holding gains on NFC inventories. We cal-
culated annual estimates of the nominal holding gain that
would be just sufficient to offset inflation. This
figure is then subtracted from the corresponding year's
IVA to obtain an estimated real holding gain. (See Appendix
Table A7.)
The results are displayed in Table 7. Although the average holding
gain for the entire 1946-75 period was quite small (only .02 percent), there
were substantial gains and losses in particular periods. Holding gains were
positive on average up to 1957, then negative in every year but one from
1958 to 1971. There have been large pusitive holding gains from 1972 to 1975.
roc's with and without holding gains are compared in Figure 4.
Including holding gains increases the volatility of the ROC's, especially in
the 1940's and 1950's. The volatility of the rates of return actually
realized by investors was still greater, however — compare Tables 1 and 7.
The decline in NFC profitability since the mid-1960 's is
less severe, but still apparent when real holding gains are included in ROC.
COa
Table 7
ESTIMATED REAL HOLDING GAINS ON CAPITAL STOCK AND
INVENTORIES OF NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS, 1946-72
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It becomes much more difficult to make sense of the 1946-65 period. We
are not convinced that year-to-year fluctuations in real holding gains
measured from the NIPA have much significance for the issues considered in
24/
this paper.
—
Summary . — We believe that any conclusions about the pattern of
ROC over time will remain valid over a wide range of alternative measures.
Comparing Alternative Profitability Measures
In Table 8 we list means and standard deviations for all the ROC
series developed in our study, and for R, the real rate of return earned by
investors in NFC's. Comments on these alternative measures follow.
1. The average "standard" after-tax ROC was 6.8 percent for 1929-75.
It was virtually the same (6.7 percent) for the 30 years since the end of
World War II. (See lines 1 and 2 in Table 8.) The larger standard deviation
for the longer series reflects the more volatile economic experience of the
depression and the War.
2. Similarly, R, the real return earned by investors, averaged
substantially the same for the post-war years as for the longer time period.
(Lines 11 and 12.)
3. Moreover, both measures of return — on corporate assets on
the one hand and on corporate ownerships and claims on the other — were of
the same order of magnitude (Lines 1, 2, 4, 11, 12 and 13). It is comforting,
but not surprising, to end up with this result. In the long-run a congruence
between the average returns on corporate securities and on corporate investment
is to be expected. In shorter periods, of course, the two returns can be
widely divergent, as the very different standard deviations suggest.
- 21a -
TABLE 8
Mean Values and Standard Deviations of
Rates of Return Series
(percent per year)
Series
1. ROC(AT): Standard Case, 1929-197.''
2. ROC(AT): Standard Case, 1946-197:
3. ROC (AT): After Corporate and Pergonal
Taxes, 1946-1975
4. ROC(AT): Standard Case, 1947-1975
5. ROC(AT): Augmented Base, 1947-1975
6. ROC(AT): Standard Case, 1946-1972
7. ROC(AT): Double-Declining Balance, 1946-1972
8. ROC(AT): Changing Depreciable Lives,
1946-1972
9. ROC(AT): "Historical Cost," 1946-1972
10. ROC(AT): Standard Case with "Holding Gains,"
1946-1975
11. Real Return Earned by Investors in NFC's,
1929-1975
12. Real Return Earned by Investors in NFC's,
1946-1975
13. Real Return Earned by Investors in NFC's,
1947-1975
14. ROC(BT): Standard Case, 1929-1975
15. ROC(BT): Standard Case, 194o-1975
Standard
Error of Standard
Estimated Deviation
Mean Mean of Series
6.80
- 22 -
4. The most appropriate series for comparison with R is the after-
tax ROC for the Augmented Base (Lines 5 and 13) . The important point is
that the two series have averages of the same order of magnitude. The per-
centage point difference between them — a slightly higher rate of return
to investors than to corporate assets — is not statistically significant.
5. In all likelihood, the "true" average after-tax ROC is between
6 and 7 percent — the range encompassed by the set of alternative measures
(Lines 6, 7, 8 and 10).
6. It is particularly interesting to find a virtually identical
result for the standard base ROC whether or not real holding gains on corporate
assets are included in earnings (Lines 2 and 10). Over the Post-War period
these capital gains and losses have just about cancelled out. The ROC de-
fined to include "holding gains" is, of course, a more volatile measure,
with a standard deviation about twice as high as our "standard" ROC.
7. That prevailing accounting conventions provide seriously mis-
leading evidence on real corporate profitability is highlighted by the "his-
torical cost" results. This measure, which averaged more than 4 percentage
points higher than the correct results, gives a rate of return that is 60
percent too high (Lines 6 and 9)
.
8. Over the past 30 years, the before-tax ROC averaged 12.5 percent.
The difference between before and after-tax ROC's (Lines 15 and 2 of Table 8)
reflects the effective corporate tax rate. On average, government received
46 percent of NFC operating income in corporate taxes. We remind the
reader, however, that the effective tax rate has tended to decline in the
period 1946-1975.
9. Additional taxes were levied on the NFC operating income upon
23 -
its distribution to individual claimants. Taking account of the personal
income tax as well as the corporate income tax reduces the ROC by one per-
centage point (Line 3), and indicates that the government has taken.
the lion's share of operating income over the post-war period, 54 percent.
Searching for Trends
Nordhaus characterized the behavior of postwar ROC's as "a defi-
nite downtrend from 1948 to the middle 1950's; a dramatic recovery from the
25/
late 1950's to the mid-1960's; and a deterioration to a plateau by 1970."
—
He interprets this behavior as a postwar downtrend in corporate
profitability, reflecting a steady decline on the opportunity cost of
., , 26/
capital.
—
This is not so clear to us. First, it is too easy to see a post-
1948 downward trend in Nordhaus 's figures. In 1948 ROC was at a cyclical
peak, well above the ROC's for 1946 and 1947. The downward trend is not
so obvious if one starts in 1946. Second, recent data revisions reduce the
ROC estimates for the period 1948-62. The reduction is .7 percentage points
27/
for 1948, and roughly .2 percentage points for most years before 1962.
—
Third, the revisions increase ROC after 196^'.
Figure 5 compares the ROC's estimated by Nordhaus to our "standard'
28/
ROCi— Nordhaus 's figures are based on unrevised data for the period 1948-73.
The data on which our ROC estimates are based were recently revised and
extended. (We have not plotted the revised series for the whole period.
The ROC's from 1949 to 1965 are too close to distinguish.) Inspection of
Tables 5 and 3 leads us co doubt the existence of any secular downward
trend in ROC.
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We admit that it might be difficult to see a downward trend even
if it existed, given the volatility and cyclicality of the ROC series. Thus,
we attempted a more elaborate statistical test based on recent work by
29/
Hankin.— Table 9 reports the results of a regression of ROC on time, the
change in real GNP and the inflation rate. A Cochrane-Orcutt iterative tech-
nique was used to adjust for severe auto-correlation. The AGNP variable
corrects for business cycle effects, and the inflation variable corrects mainly
30/
for the impact of inflation on the effective tax rate.— Notice that the
coefficient of time in the postwfir regression for after-tax ROC is positive
although not significant. The other coefficients offer no surprises.
We do have one puzzle. Table 4 seems to show a doi^mward trend in
the effective tax rate. If that trend is accepted, then we can hardly rule
out trends in both the before and after-ta>; ROC's. But if there is a trend in
one ROC measure, which measure is it? Inspection of Figure 3 suggests a down-
ward trend in the before-tax ROC and no tr(ind in the after-tax figure. Table
9 suggests, if anything, an upward trend in the after-tax ROC, and no trend
in the before-tax figure. We end up doubting that any trends exist — although
that doesn't square with Table 4.
No doubt fancier statistical tests could be devised. But Table
9 gives no evidence whatsoever for a secular downward trend in the after-tax
ROC.
Table 9
REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS: ROC vs. TIME,
ECONOMIC GROWTH AND INFLATION
Period
- 25 -
IV. THE LINK BETWEEN REAL AND FINANCIAL MARKETS
Introduction
We have now examined both real and financial measures of NFC
performance — ROC and R, respectively. To a great extent they tell the
same story. But further insights depend on a linking up of the real and
financial sectors. The most important specific issue is how real rates of
return have behaved relative to capital costs.
It is difficult to measure the opportunity cost of capital
directly, since it is defined in terms of expected returns on debt and equity
securities. There is no simple way ti' infer expectations from historical
31/
returns .
—
But there is an alternative approach which is superior in most
respects. It is based on comparisons of the aggregate market value of cor-
porate securities with the value of real capital held by corporations.
Modern financial theory shows that the market value of a firm (MV)
equals the capitalized value of the long-run average earnings from assets now
32 /in place (Y/p)
,
plus the present value of growth opportunities (PVGO) .
—
MV = I
+ PVGO (2)
The capitalization rate p is th > equilibrium expected rate of return estab-
lished in capital markets for this firm and others of equivalent risk.
Earnings are equal to the return on capital times real capital (RC)
.
Thus Y = ROC(RC), and
MV = Rcf-^j + PVGO . (3)
- 26 -
PVGO is the present value of future opportunities to invest at rates of re-
turn in excess of the cost of capital. Growth is worth nothing if expected
ROC on future investment just equals p.' If ROC = p now and for the future,
the market value of the firm just equals the value of its real capital.
Thus q, the ratio of MV to RC, depends on the ratio of ROC to p:
_ MV ROC ^ PVGO ,,.
^ = RC = T"" "^^ ' ^^^
where PVGO is a function of ROC/p and the rate of expansion of real capital
stock.
Estimates of q can provide iseful insights into whether the rate
of return on real capital has declined relative to the cost of capital. If,
for example, we observe that q has declined, then we can conclude that ROC
31 /has declined relative to p. Moreover, we can say this with reasonable con-
fidence, since MV and RC, the determinants of q, are liable to less serious
measurement errors than ROC or p.
The methodology just outlined cannot provide specific estimates
of the rates of return or the cost of capital for any particular year. But
the approach should permit us to identify changes in the spread between
present and anticipated future profitability, on the one hand, and capital
costs on the other. We believe this is the more relevant comparison. For
example, it bears directly on the concern that the falling rate of return re-
"3/ /
duces the incentive to invest.
—
To summarize, changes in q over time for the NFC sector should pro-
vide a clear measure of how present and anticipated rates of return on
real capital have behaved relative tc t^-c cost of capital.
- 11 -
The Behavior of q and ROC over Time
non-financial corporations is presen
29/
The time series of q for ted
and discussed in Section II of this paper. It is replotted in Figure 6.
We see again that the early and mid-1950 's were an unfavorable period rela-
tive to the mid-1960 's. Investors in 1965 must have anticipated ROC's well
in excess of the opportunity cost of capital, p. Since 1965 there has been
a clear downtrend in q, however, which we can now interpret as a decline in
the ratio ROC/p-
What accounts for the fluctuations in q? It is difficult to say,
since we lack a reliable estimate of ;3. But the data strongly suggest that
changes in q since the late 1950 's are mostly responses to iihanges in ROC.
As Figure 6 shows, the year-to-year movements of q and ROC c )rrespond
35 /
closely after 1958.— There is no such obvious relationship before 1958.
This interpretation is reinforced by Figure 7 , which shows the
ratio of NFC operating income to market value for the period 1946-75. This
ratio can be thought of as a generalized earnings-price
ratio where "price" equals MV and "earnings" equals real operating
income. There is no evident trend in this ratio since the mld-1950's, and
its volatility since then has been much less than in the first postwar decade.
The ratio of operating earnings to MV is as close as we can get to
a direct estimate of the real cost of capital p. In principle we should
estimate
/mv (dA /mv (E)\
Eq- (5) corresponds to Eq. (1), except that the p's are expe .ted rates of
return — e.g., p = E(R ). Now, if_ the total expected doll ir return to
debt and equity is just equal to Y , i.e..
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P^MV^ = p^(D)NV|.(D) + p^(E)MV^(E) = Y^, (6)
then p = Y /MV , which is the ratio plotted in Figure 7. Unfortunately,
Eq. (6) makes a number of implicit assumptions. For example, it holds
only if growth opportunities are absent (PVGO = 0) and if Y equals investors'
expectations of average future earnings generated by assets held at t.
Nevertheless, if we can take the ratio as a rough estimate of p, we
must conclude that p declined steadily from its postwar peak in the late 19A0's.
36/
Since 1956 it has fluctuated in a range from five to seven percent,— which
matches the average ROC (AT) over the postwar period. Morover, since the
ROC (AT) over the entire postwar period, has shown no trend, it appears
that the rate of return on corporate assets has matched the weighted average
cost of capital.
We conclude, therefore, that tbe decline in corporate real profita-
bility (ROC) over the last decade has not been matched by a corresponding
decline in the real opportunity cost of capital.
The Absolute Value of q
As Figure 6 shows, q has averaged approximately 1.0 over the last
few years. (For 1976 it is probably back up to at least 1.0). One is tempted
to conclude that NFC's art earning just enough to cover the opportunity cost
of capital (ROC = p) . But any such conclusion must be cautiously held. For
one thing the Standard Base does not include some assets. Although changes
in q are, we believe, a reliable signal of changes in ROC relative to p,
the absolute value of q is a less trustworthy statistic.
Nevertheless, it is difficult to see how the "true" value of q could
be much in excess of 1.0. If q is computed on the augmented capital base, for
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example, then its 1975 value becomes .73 rather than .80. Even the augmented
base may be an underestimate of the replacement cost of all corporate assets.
We know, for example, that the augmented base includes only the book value of
land, not its current value. It is true that q would be higher if accelerated
rather than straight-line depreciation had been used in estimating the net
replacement cost of plant and equipment. But the combined use of accelerated
depreciation and the augmented base would not generate a value for q much in
excess of 1.0.
Where are the intangible assets, the growth opportunities, and the
monopoly rents? Apparently, in the last few years they count for very little
when NFC's are examined in aggregate. We found this surprising. Financial
economists are accustomed to pointing out the assets that accountants to not
recognize — going-concern value, the fruits of past research and development,
product repuation, and so on. They have come to think of growth firms as an
important part of our economy. They believe that some firms have monopoly
power. In each case they can cite firms as examples to back, up their beliefs.
Yet these firms are evidently atypical. Judging from q, there is little evi-
dence that intangible assets, growth opportunities, and monopoly rents have
a significant impact on the current value of NFC's, although one or more of
these effects must have been important in the mid-1960's, and also in earlier
periods, e.g. 1934-39.
- 30 -
V. CONCLUSION
There is no question that NFC's have fared poorly since the mid-
1960' s. The fact is obvious from the low real rates of return realized by
investors in NFC's. The poor performahce is confirmed by declining operat-
ing profitability over the same period.
Whether the most recent data are viewed optimistically or pessi-
mistically depends on which past period is taken as "normal." The evidence
is that in the mid-1960' s NFC's real profitability was much higher, relative
to the opportunity cost of capital, than it is now. On the other hand, NFC's
are better off now than in the mid-1950's. Operating profitability (ROC)
is about the same now as then, but the cost of capital is lower. (If
there is a capital "shortage," it has as yet had no observable effect on the
cost of capital.)
Over long periods — 1946-75, or 1929-75 — we have found no trend
in the after-tax rate of return on corporate assets.
In the last few year;5 the aggregate market value of NPC's was at
most equal to the net replacement cost of all NPC assets. There was no evi-
dence that capital markets in recent years perceived NFC's as having, in
aggregate, substantial intangible growth opportunities. In short, the evi-
dence we have presented gives no basis for concluding that current or antici-
pated ROC's on NFC assets exceed the current opportunity cost of capital.
It seems reasonable to say that the real cost of capital for NFC's
has been about 6 to 7 percent since the late 1950 's. The average long real
profitability of NFC's has also been 6 to 7 percent. In the period from 1929 up
to the late 1950' s, the annual cost of capital was a volatile series. Since
then fluctuations in market value have bet n more closely related to variations
in profitability than to shifts in the costs of capital.
FOOTNOTES
1. This report incorporates research sponsored by M.I.T.'s Project on
International Business and by the Committee for Economic Development.
We are grateful to the sponsors for their support, and to Fischer Black,
Jack. Ciccolo, Everett Hagan, John Gorman and Allen Sinai for their help
in acquiring necessary data and working out methodological issues. We are
especially indebted to Sudipto Bhattacharya, Robert Jarrow and Richard
Weiss, our research assistants on this project, and to Roger Hankin for
allowing us to rely on his research on the link between corporate profita-
bility and inflation [9 ].
The authors take full responsibility for errors, however.
2. The stock market's valuation of growth firms like IBM, Hewlett-
Packard, Digital Equipment Corporation, or Eastman Kodak can only be
explained by the present value of profitable future investment oppor-
tunities. Current earnings are insufficient to account for these firm's
values, even if capitalized at high-grade bond yields.
3. See, for example, Jensen's study of mutual fund performance [11 ] and
other evidence summarized by Fama [ 7 ]
.
4. For evidence, see Lc rie and Hamilton [14], Fama's review article [7],
and the articles collected in Lorie and Brealey [13].
5. There is no reason for the relative past performance of stocks and bonds
to affect firms' capital investment decisions, for example.
6. R does not, however, measure the return earned by the government via
taxation. In a sense MV understates the value of NFC's, because it
does not include the present value of future taxes.
7. We have followed procedures worked out by John Ciccolo, Jr. in [4].
We are grateful for his assistance.
Footnotes 2
8. The portfolio was constructed by Ibbotsen and Sinquefield [lol-
This portfolio's maturity undoubtedly overstates the average maturity
of NFC debt. Consequently, the mean and volatility of our estimate
of R (D) are overstatements of the. true mean and volatility. Ibbotsen
and Sinquefield found that both mean return and volatility have in-
creased with bond maturity. See [10], Table 9, p. 40.
9. We are not implying that there are meaningful "trends" or "cycles" in
the rates of return shown in Table 1. It is not possible to predict
future R 's from the historical figures shown. No investor standing
at any point in the 1947-75 period could have used the R 's observed
up to the point to predict future Rj^'s. It is only hindsight that allows
us to interpret the history of rates of return.
10. Often referred to as "Tobin's q." James Tobin has emphasized the im-
portance of this ratio and employed it in theoretical and empirical
work. See, for example, [20] and [22]. See also the 1977 Economic
Report of the President [6], pp. 28-29.
11. CS^ is an average of starting and ending values of NFC capital stock and
inventories. Thus CS is a simple average of figures for the end of
1949 and the end of 1950. MV is estimated as of mid-year — the end of the
second quarter of year t. This convention facilitates comparison of q
to the rate of return measures presented in Section III below. Unfor-
tunately, it also mal.es it difficult to match year-by-year fluctuations in
q and R, since R is based on market values computed at the end of calendar
years. We do not attach much significance to any single year's value of
q^ or R , however.
12- [ 6], p. 28.
Footnotes 3
1-3- This statement is strictly true only in a partial equilibrium
analysis.
/
14. Nordhaus [17] and Terborgh [19] in particular.
15. We are indebted to John A. Gorman, Assistant to the Associate Director
for National Income Accounts, for supplying these revised data prior
to their publication in the Survey of Current Business .
16. Remember that the ROC's shown in Table 3 are intended as measures of
real, not monetary, rates of reti rn. They should be compared to the
real R's in Table 1, and to real, not nominal, interest rates.
17. See Hankin [9]. This study was based on measures of ROC which are
slightly different from those used in this study. Later he was kind
enough to replicate his results using the ROC's reported in Table 3.
The results for the after-tax ROC for 1947-75 are (t- statistics
in parentheses):
ROC = 5.93 + T - .183AGNP - .195AP
(10.5) (1.78) (5.13) (-3.76)
where T = a linear time trend from 1947 to 1975. T
is standardized to have a mean of zero.
^NP = the percentage ^ihange in real GNP .
AP = the percentage change in the consumer price index.
The equation was fitted using a Cochrane-Orcutt iterative technique to
correct for a serious positive autocorrelation of residuals (p = .733).
18. We stop the comparison with 1972, the most recent year for which
revised data for the alternative assumptions were available.
Footnotes 4
19. Current corporate accounting practice differs from historical cost
accounting as we have calculated it from the NIPA. Many firms use
LIFO inventory accounting, for example, and assume shorter depreciable
lives than 85 percent of Bulletin F values.
20. Christensen and Jorgenson [ 3] have developed estimates of rates of
return for the entire corporate sector (not just NFC's) after all
taxes, including property taxes and personal income taxes on corporate
Income. These estimates, although they extend only through 1973,
appear to show a pattern consistent with our results.
21. The specific items were cash, accounts receivable, land, intangibles,
and other assets. Accounts payable and other non-interest bearing
liabilities were subtracted. "Investments" were not added, since most
Items in this category are interest-bearing marketable securities, and
operating income is measured before net interest paid. That is, the
interest income earned on these rissets is subtracted from interest paid
on NFC debt. Since the interest income on investments is not included
in the numerator of the ROC calci lation, it is inappropriate to include
the value of these investments in the denominator.
22. Averages for after-tax ROC for the three periods we have distinguished
are (figures in percent):
Table 3 Table 6
1946-60 6:3 1947-60 5.7
1961-70 8.0 1961-70 7.1
1971-75 5.6 1971-75 4.9
23. Let CS and INV be the net replacement cost of a firm's capital stock
and inventory, respectively, at the end of period t. Then the total
nominal income realized in period t includes operating income, net of
depreciation calculated on CS
_
,
plus the holding gains realized on
capital stock and inventories. Thus
Footnotes 5
Total
Nominal
Income
Operating
Income
Nominal
+ Holding
Gains
The holding gain on capital stock is
Nominal
Holding
Gain
= CS cs
t-1
Depreciation
- charged
against CS
t-1
Capital
acquired dur-
ing period t
The holding gain on inventory is computed in the same way.
These holding gains are nominal because they are partly or wholly due
to inflation. CS and INV are computed in period t dollars, while
CS , and INV
_, are computed in t-1 dollars. We could calculate real
holding gains by re-expressing CS
^
and INV
_^
in period t dollars.
If i is the general inflation rate (the change in Consumer Price Index,
for example) between periods t-1 and t, then the real holding gain on
capital stock is
Real
Holding
Gain
CS
^
- (l+ij.)CS^_^ - Charged
against CS
Depreciation Capital
- Acquired Dur-
ing Period t
For convenience we assume that operating income, depreciation and
acquisitions of capital stock and income are all expressed in period
t dollars.
If replacement costs increase only in response to general inflation —
i.e. at exactly the rate i — then real holding gains are zero. This,
in turn, means that real total income is just exactly equal to operating
Income
.
(There is no need to distinguish between real and nominal operating
income. Operating income is expressed in period t dollars, which are
the units of measurement for both real and nominal total income.)
24. The holding gains have no evident relationship to q or to the real rates
of return earned by investors.
Footnotes 6
25. [17], pp. 180-81.
26. [17], pp. 205-208.
27. The revisions increase ROC in only one year — 1956. It is unaffected
in 1955 and 1957. It is reduced in all other years between 1948 and
1962.
28. In this chart only we have plotted our standard ROC computed excluding
net NFC residential capital from the standard base. This was done to
allow a consistent comparison with Nordhaus's figures.
29. Hankin [ 9] worked with ROC data from an earlier version of this study.
Our tests replicate his model exactly, except tor slight changes in the
ROC figures. We are grateful for his help.
30. Hankin found that the main impact of inflation on after-tax ROC occurred
via the effective corporate tax rate. See fn. 17 above.
31. We believe Nordhaus is the only investigator who has attempted to measure
and compare trends in the rate of return and the cost of capital. But his
cost of capital measure is flawed by (1) the use of book, rather than
market values, for debt and equity in his weighted average cost of capital
measure; (2) an inappropriate adjustment for the tax shield provided by
interest; (3) using a risk-free rate to measure the expected rate of
return on corporate bonds; and (4) using the earnings-price ratio for the
expected market rate of return on equity. (See [17], esp. p. 199.) Assump-
tion (4), or some equally simple rule of thumb, is perhaps unavoidable
when dealing with aggregate data. But the first three assumptions can
be improved upon.
32. This approach to valuation was first presented by Miller and Modigliani [15]
Footnotes 7
33. This assumes a constant expected long-term rate of expansion in real
capital stock. It is conceivable that q could vary due to changes in the
expected rate of investment, even with ROC and p constant. But we consider
this unlikely, for two reasons. First, if ROC and p are constant, there
is no obvious mechanism to account for changes in the real investment rate.
Second, Figures 6 and 7 below show that recent fluctuations in MV can be
largely accounted for by changes in ROC.
34. We do not claim that this new approach is without its own difficulties.
For example, there are problems in defining and measuring real capital,
and in estimating market values. These problems are likely to be particu-
larly severe in cross-se<;tional comparisons. There is little meaning in
comparing the q's of the drug and steel industries, for example, since so
much of the drug industry's assets do not show on balance sheets. (Com-
parisons of the industriiis' ROG's would be just as suspect — perhaps more
so.) At best one could make rough adjustments such as capitalizing
and amortizing advertising and outlays on research and development. On
the other hand, biases in estimating RC or MV are not likely to be volatile
over time . Thus a change in q can be clearly interpreted even though the
absolute value of the ratio cannot. See pp. 11-lld above.
35. Values of q and ROC presented in Figure 6 are calculated from the standard,
rather than the augmented, estimates of capital stock.
36. The exception is 1975. However, we suspect that the stock market's strong
performance in early 1976 has restored the relationship.
37. Remember that we have estimated in real terms. The current perception of
high capital costs is based on nominal rates.
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Appendix
In this appendix we tabulate the estimates prepared for our study.
Notes that explain the derivation of the estimates follow each table.
List of Tables
Title
Table Al Market Values of Debt and Equity of Non-Financial
Corporations, 1929-75
Table A2a Net Capital Stock and Inventories of Non-Financia^
Corporations, 1929-75
Table A2b Net Capital Stock and Inventories of Non-Financial
Corporations, 1946-72
Table A2c Net Capital Stock and Inventories of Non-Financial Corporations
Corporations, 19^6-72
Table A2d Net Capital Stock and Inventories of Non-Financial
Corporations, 19^^6-72
Table A3 Estimated Total Non-Financial Assets of Non- "inancial
Corporations, 19^7-75
Table AAa Profits of Non-Financial Corporations, 1929-75
Table A4b Profits of Non-Financial Corporations, 1946-72
Table A4c Profits of Non-Financial Corporations, 1947-72
Table A4d Profits of Non-Financial Corporations, 1946- "2
Table A5 Estimated Real Holding Gains on Capital Stoc-; of Non-
Financial Corporations, 1930-75
Table A6 Estimated Real Holding Gains on Inventory of Non-
Financial Corporations, 1946-75
Table a1
MARKET VALUES OF DEBT AND EQUITY OF
NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS, 1929-75
Figures in Billions
Table Al (continued)
Table Al (continued)
Table Al (continued)
Table A2a
NET CAPITAL STOCK AND INVENTORIES OF
NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS, 1929-75
Standard Base, Straight-Line Depreciation,
Service Lives 85 percent of Bulletin F
Figures in Billions, Current Dollars
Table A2a (continued)
Table A2b
NET CAPITAL STOCK AND INVENTORIES OF
NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS, 1946-72
Standard Base, Double Declining Balance Depreciatiim
,
Service Lives 85 percent of Bulletin F
Figures in Billions, Current Dollars
Table A2c
NET CAPITAL SK'CK AND INVENTORIES OF
NON-FINANCIAL CORPOKATIONS, 19A6-72
Standard Base, Straight- Line Depreciation Service Lives
Shifting from Bulletin F to 75 percent of Bulletin F over Time
Figures in Bil" ions. Current Dollars
Table A2d
NET CAPITAL STOCK AND INVENTORIES OF
NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS, 1946-72
Standard Base, Straight Line Depreciation Based on
Historical Cost, Servict Lives 85 percent of Bulletin F
Figures in Billions, Current Dollars
Table A3
ESTIMATF.D TOTAL NON- FINANCIAL ASSETS
OF NON-FINANCIAL CORP )RATIONS , 194 7-75
Figures in Billions, Current Dollars
Table A3 (continued)
Definitions for cash and accounts receivable are those used in
Statistics of Income . "Other net current assets" is defined as:
"Assets not allocated to a specific current account in the return form
balance sheet, and assets specifically reported as short-term by the
corporation, as well as marketable securities other than Government
obligations ..." ( Statistics of Income , 1968, Corporation Income
Tax Returns
,
p. 166.)
Other net current assets do not include investments. The object was
to include all other non- interest bearing current assets, net of all
other non-interest bearing current liabilities.
Statistics of Income does not give figures for non-financial corpora-
tions directly. The figures for financial corporations were subtracted
from the total for all corporations.
Column 5 was obtained by summing columns 2, 3 and 4 and averaging
beginning and end of year values. Column 6 is the sum of columns 1
and 5.
Note : Columns 1, 5 and 6 are averages of beginning and end of year values.
Columns 2, 3 and 4 are end of year values.
Table A4a
PROFITS OF NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS, 1929-75
Straight-line Depreciation
,
Service Lives 85 Percent of Bulletin F
Figures in Billions, Current Dollars
Table A4a (continued)
Table A4b
PROFITS OF NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS, 1946-72
DoubJe Declining Balance Depreciation
,
Service Lives 85 Perc ent of Bulletin F
Figures in Billions, Current Dollars
Table A5 - Sources (continued)
This is the formula used to estimate the percentage returns given in
column 4.
5. Dollar Holding Gain . The product of column 4 and the "Standard Base."
The Standard Base is taken from Table A2a.
Table A4d
PROFITS OF NON-FINANCIAL COEIPORATIONS , 1946-72
Historical Cost Depreciation
,
Service Lives 85 Percent of Bulletin F
Figure:; in Billions, Current Dollars
Table A5
ESTIMATED REAL HOLDING GAINS ON CAPITAL
STOCK OF NON-FINANCIAL :ORPORATIONS , 1930-75
Table A6
ESTIMATED REAL HOLDIN(^. GAINS ON INVENTORY
OF NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS, 1946-75
Year
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
Inventory
Valuation
Adjustment
5.3
5.9
2.2
-1.9
5.0
1.2
-1.0
1.0
.3
1.7
2.7
. 1.5
.3
.5
-.3
-.1
-.1
.2
.5
1.9
2.1
1.7
3.4
5.5
5.1
5.0
6.6
18.4
36.5
11.5
Mid-Year
Inventory
70.
77.
79.
79.
81.
90.
98.0
,2
,4
.3
,7
100.
99.
101.
107.
111.1
110.1
112.2
118.6
118.9
126.1
132.6
139.7
148.8
160.6
175.4
185.9
195.6
201.8
206.3
210.0
219.4
231.5
226.6
Percent Change
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